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7 December 1960

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Copy No. C 801-2

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



DOCUMENT NO. 32
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S 6
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010
AUTH: HN 702
DATE: 10 JUN 1980
REVIEWER: _____



State Dept. review completed

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005400320001-6

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005400320001-6

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DAILY BRIEF

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Indonesia: [The increasingly cordial relations between President Sukarno and the Soviet bloc during the past six months appear to have strengthened Sukarno's intention to include the domestic Communist party in the Djakarta government. According to the US ambassador in Djakarta, factors influencing Sukarno are his belief that the United States is opposed to him personally, the Soviet Union's cultivation of him as a leader of the Afro-Asian bloc, massive Soviet economic and military aid, and his views of socialism and Western colonialism. The army leaders, when unified, have the power and the will to resist Sukarno on a sharply defined issue of Communist representation in the cabinet, but the President, by clouding this issue, may successfully outmaneuver the army.]

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Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005400320001-6

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Indonesian-Soviet Relations Influence Sukarno's
Domestic Policy

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[The increasingly cordial relations between President Sukarno and the Soviet bloc during the past six months appear to have strengthened Sukarno's intentions to include the domestic Communist party in the cabinet, according to the American ambassador in Djakarta.]

[Sukarno's cordiality appears largely based on Khrushchev's cultivation of him as a leader of the Afro-Asian bloc and the potential head of a third force. Sukarno has accepted Khrushchev's latest invitation to visit the USSR and is expected to go there in March or April. A further influence on Sukarno has been the bloc's support for Djakarta's claim to Netherlands New Guinea and bloc credit arrangements for economic and military aid, which now total approximately \$700 million and may soon include another \$300 million. Sukarno's own views of Marxism and Western colonialism and his concept of "Indonesian socialism" are factors in his tendency to accept Moscow's flattery and general propaganda line. In contrast to his attitude toward Moscow, Sukarno appears to believe that the United States opposes him personally.]

[The army has been the principal deterrent to Sukarno's domestic maneuvers to protect and use the Communist party. The American ambassador feels that the army may have both the power and the will to resist Sukarno on this latest aspect of the Communist issue. The ambassador fears, however, that the President may blur the issue of Communist participation in the cabinet by presenting it as identical with aspects of "Indonesian socialism" which the army has already accepted. He could also weaken the army's position by rallying the country behind him on the highly charged nationalistic claim to Netherlands New Guinea and under cover of such a campaign proceed to reorganize the cabinet.]

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7 Dec 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Page 2

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005400320001-6

Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

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